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"Democratization will not proceed in Indonesia until it is actively supported by the 
Islamic community and until the values of democracy are explicitly articulated as 
compatible with Islamic doctrine." 1
This paper looks to the grassroots to see how Islamic organizations in the post- 
Suharto period are responding to the challenge of democratic reform.2 Islam has 
played a crucial role in shaping the politics of Indonesia, and since 1998 Indonesia has 
been viewed as a test case for the compatibility of Islam and democracy.3 However,
1 "Islam in Modern Indonesia," a conference sponsored by the United States-Indonesia Society and Asia 
Foundation, February 7, 2002. This statement is one of the "key conclusions" in the Executive Summary of 
the Conference Proceedings. Speakers at the conference included Mark Woodward, Robert Flefner, Ulil 
Abshar Abdalla, Lies Marcoes Natsir, Greg Fealy, Douglas Ramage, Moeslim Abdurrahman, Rizal Sukma, 
and Donald Emmerson.
2 Research for this paper was funded by a grant from the Ford Foundation in Jakarta. I thank Ann 
Tickameyer, Laurel Fleydir, Muhammad Sirozi, and Ann Shoemaker for their comments. I also want to 
thank the young researchers in Palembang who helped to collect information about the organizations 
discussed in this paper.
3 See Robert Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1999); Anders Uhlin, Indonesia and the "Third Wave o f Democratization": The Indonesian Pro- 
Democracy Movement in a Changing World (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1997), and Douglas E. 
Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology o f Tolerance (New York: Routledge, 1995).
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there has been little research on how democratic the internal practices of Islamic 
organizations are at the local level and how the debate about what democracy means 
plays out in these organizations. As Anders Uhlins has pointed out, "Islam, like any 
major religion, is complex enough to lend itself to support all forms of political 
systems, from the most authoritarian to the most democratic. The question is which 
interpretations are the most influential and powerful in a certain context."4
My focus on the institutionalization of democratic practices in Islamic 
organizations at the local level and their discourses on Islam and democracy addresses 
two questions. The first is whether Islamic organizations could play a central role in 
supporting a transition to a more democratic and accountable government in 
Indonesia. The second concerns the effects of the Indonesian government's policy of 
supporting democratization through decentralization. In 1999, the Indonesian 
Parliament passed Laws 22/99 and 25/99, transferring authority over local 
administration from the central government to the districts and bypassing the 
provincial government. The policy of decentralization means that Islamic 
organizations at the local level could contribute to developing a more complex and 
shared conception of what demokrasi (democracy) means and to shaping the ways in 
which decentralization supports or fails to support democratization. To assess the 
likelihood that Islamic organizations in Indonesia will support democratization—in the 
form of regular elections, acceptance of majority rule in decision making, toleration of 
conflict, open debate of issues, protection of the rights of minorities, and procedures 
that hold leaders accountable—I observe the activities of local Islamic organizations in 
the post-Suharto period to see whether more democratic practices are being adopted 
and if a more complex understanding of democratic concepts and values is emerging.
Theoretically, this study is grounded in Stanley Tambiah's concept of 
"participatory rationality." Drawing on the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tambiah 
contrasts action based on the means-end calculation of instrumental rationality with 
participatory rationality in which people appeal to values and commitments shared 
with others to achieve collective goals.5 People apply both instrumental and 
participatory rationality in organizing collective action. For democratic concepts and 
values to become legitimate, people must practice applying them successfully in 
pursuit of their interests and collective projects.6 Thus, this essay follows the logic of 
Anders Uhlin's assessment that "democratic ideas are considered applicable to the 
Indonesian context to the extent that people have some kind of material interest in 
democracy."7
Islamic organizations in South Sumatra vary dramatically in their expressed 
commitment to or rejection of democratic values and in the way they are politically
4 Uhlin, Indonesia and the "Third Wave o f Democratization," p. 83.
5 See Stanley Tambiah, Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope o f  Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990).
6 This approach has many similarities to analyses that use the concept of "social capital," which "refers to 
features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating coordinated actions," but it places greater emphasis on the concepts that people 
appeal to in organizing effective collective action. See Robert Putnam, R. Leonardi, and R. Nanetti, Making 
Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 167.
7 Uhlin, Indonesia and the "Third Wave o f Democratization," p. 246.
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structured, ranging from Muhammadiyah, which supports democratic values and 
applies those values in its practices, to the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela 
Islam) and the Islamist Council of Indonesian Mujahidin (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia), 
which explicitly reject democracy and have an authoritarian structure. This study 
suggests that in the more open political environment of the post-Suharto period, the 
authoritarian Islamic organizations are losing their appeal, and organizations that 
appeal to Islamic values—such as the unity of the Islamic community and the authority 
of religious leaders—have begun to change in ways that make their practices more 
democratic. This study supports the conclusion that the flowering of Islamic 
organizations and open competition among them builds an awareness of the important 
advantages of democratic participation in decision making and provides experience in 
collective action. These comprise important steps toward building a stronger civil 
society and a more democratic and accountable government at the local level.
This paper is divided into three parts. The first part briefly describes the history of 
Islam in South Sumatra, a province noted for religious piety, and reviews the impact of 
New Order policies on Islamic organizations in South Sumatra. The second part 
describes concepts that were central to a debate that emerged in the last decade of the 
New Order about the relationship of Islam to democracy. The third part consists of 
case studies of Islamic organizations in South Sumatra, focusing on the conceptions of 
democracy that are articulated by the local leaders of these organizations and the ways 
in which their decision making is structured. Included are studies of three long- 
established organizations known for their moderation and support of democracy—the 
modernist Muhammadiyah, the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and the National 
Organization of Muslim students (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI); three dakwah 
(Islamic mission) organizations founded during the New Order—Mosque Youth (Remaja 
Masjid), the School Dakwah Forum (Forum Dakwah Sekolah, FORDS), and the Action 
Committee of Indonesian Muslim Students (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim 
Indonesia, KAMMI); and two militant Islamic organizations that established branches in 
South Sumatra in the post-Suharto era, Front Pembela Islam (FPI) and Majelis Mujahidin 
Indonesia (MMI).
I. Islam in South Sumatra
The people of Palembang, the capital of South Sumatra, have a reputation for 
combining entrepreneurial concerns with Islamic piety. Muslim merchants from the 
Middle East traded in Palembang as early as the tenth century. With the founding of 
the Palembang Sultanate in the seventeenth century, Palembang became a center for 
trade with the Arab world and a center of Islamic learning. The most famous Islamic 
scholar from Palembang was Abd al-Shamad, known as al-Palimbani, the son of a 
Sayyid (a title denoting a direct descendant of the Prophet) from the Hadramaut in 
Yemen who married a woman from Palembang. Al-Palimbani, who was born around 
1700, is said to have been educated in Kedah and Pattani on the Malay Peninsula. Then 
he was sent to Arabia to continue his education. There he joined the community of 
Malay Muslims, known as Jawi. Through his writings, al-Palimbani spread neo-Sufi
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teachings to Southeast Asia and encouraged Muslims to engage in jihad (struggle) 
against the European colonizers.8
During the rule of Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin (1775-1804), many traders from the 
Hadramaut settled in Palembang. In 1885, the Arab community of Palembang, 
consisting of two thousand people, was the second-largest Hadrami community in 
Indonesia after Aceh.9 The Alawiyin (Hadrami elite that claimed descent from the 
Prophet through his son-in-law Ali) spread a rigorous and devout form of Islam. They 
sponsored the construction of mosques and neighborhood prayer houses (langgar), 
which also served as Islamic schools. In 1848, Kemas Haji Abd Allah established an 
Islamic press in Palembang, and the first journal of the Hadrami awakening, al-Bashir 
(The Harbinger) was published in Palembang.10 According to Dutch records, in 1890 
there were 230 institutions of religious education in Palembang, with a total of 4,500 
pupils.11 In 1898, Palembang sent 715 pilgrims to Mecca, a number exceeded only by 
Banten (1,289) and Priangan (837).12
In 1913, a local branch of Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association) was established in 
South Sumatra with 7,246 members (out of eighteen thousand members in all the 
Netherlands East Indies). At the end of the 1920s and 30s, branches of Muhammadiyah 
were established in market towns like Pagar Alam and Kota Batu Ranau when youths 
sent to study in Java or outside Indonesia returned home with the idea of "modernist 
Islam." Many people in South Sumatra received their first education in schools 
established by Muhammadiyah volunteer teachers.13 The traditionalist Nahdlatul 
Ulama (NU) opened branches in Lahat and Bukit Tinggi in 1936-38.14 In the first 
elections of the Indonesian Republic in 1955, the modernist Islamic political party 
Masyumi won seventeen out of forty seats in the South Sumatra legislature, making it 
the strongest party in the province.
When regional rebellions claiming Islamic credentials broke out in 1957, the central 
government acted quickly to prevent South Sumatra from joining these rebellions and 
to protect the security of its oil installations. General Nasution gave Colonel Ibnu
8 See Azyumardi Azra, Jaringan Ulama Timur Tengah dan Kepulauan Nusantara Abad XVII dan XVIII: Melacak 
Akar-akar Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam di Indonesia (Bandung: Mizan, 1994), pp. 146-47, 251.
9 By contrast, there were no more than three hundred Dutch in Palembang in the nineteenth century. See 
Jeroen Peeters, "Space, Religion, and Conflict: The Urban Ecology of Islamic Institutions in Palembang," 
Issues in Urban Development: Case Studies from Indonesia, ed. Peter J. M. Nas (Leiden: Research School 
CNWS, 1995), p. 145.
10 Jeroen Peeters, "Palembang Revisited: Further Notes on the Printing Establishment of Kemas Haji 
Muhammad Azhari, 1848," in International Institute for Asian Studies Yearbook 1995, ed. Paul van der Velde 
(Leiden: International Institute for Asian Studies, 1995), pp. 181-90, quoted in Michael Laffan, Islamic 
Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma below the Winds (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 
2003), p. 145.
11 Peeters, "Space, Religion, and Conflict," p. 147.
12 E.T. van Delden, "De bedevaart naar Mekka van 1898," De Indische Gids 21,1: 553, quoted in Michael 
Laffan, Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia, p. 64.
13 Author's interview with Amran Halim, former rector of Sriwijaya University in Palembang, November 
1, 2002.
14 Interview with H. A. Ibrahim Yusun, head of the Provincial Board of PKB-South Sumatra (Partai 
Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party), conducted by Adang Yuliansyah in 1999.
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Sutowo, a Javanese officer known to be loyal to the Republic, command over forces in 
the province. When the commander of the Palembang garrison joined the rebels and 
fled with his unit into the forests above Bengkulu, he was hunted down by Ibnu 
Sutowo's forces.15 In South Sumatra, support for the rebellion appears to have been 
due mainly to dissatisfaction with the central government's exploitation of the region's 
economic resources rather than with Islamic mobilization.
After the coup attempt of September 30, 1965, in which the Indonesian Communist 
Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) was implicated, the army again moved quickly 
to control events in South Sumatra. Military units in Palembang began arresting PKI 
members and people in affiliated groups within days of the coup. Islamic 
organizations in South Sumatra supported the actions of the military, but local Islamic 
and Christian youth groups did not actively participate in rounding up people or the 
killing that followed.16
During the first twenty-five years of the New Order, South Sumatra enjoyed a 
visible increase in prosperity due to its oil resources. The middle class in Palembang 
grew, expanding into suburbs that now ring the city, and a new, rural middle class 
developed in the hinterlands, especially in the highland coffee-growing areas. 
Educational opportunities expanded. Sriwijaya University (UNSRI, Universitas 
Sriwijaya) had been established in 1960 when the national government took over the 
only private university. There was also a Muhammadiyah Law School, which became a 
university, and three private Islamic institutions of higher learning. In the early 1960s, 
the latter were incorporated into the system of State Institutes for the Study of Islam 
(Institut Agama Islam Negeri, IAIN), becoming IAIN Raden Fatah. During the New 
Order, eight more institutions of higher education were established.
In 1978, student protests in Java against the reelection of Suharto led to the 
promulgation of the Campus Normalization Act, banning all political activity on 
university campuses. In reaction to government repression, students at the Institute of 
Technology Bandung (ITB) turned to the Salman Mosque, where they were inspired by 
the fiery sermons of Imaduddin Abdurrahim, who introduced them to the ideas of the 
Muslim Brothers.17 Salman mosque became the model for dakwah, exemplifying Islam 
as a total way of life (nizam kamil), a concept central to the ideology of Sayyid Qutb and
15 Sejarah Perkembangan Pemerintahan di Daerah Sumatera Selatan (Palembang: Publication of the Provincial 
Government, 1996), pp. 280-291.
16 Author's interview with Djohan Hanafiah, who in 1965 was a leader in South Sumatra of the Indonesian 
Nationalist Student Movement (Gerakan Mahasiswa Nationalis Indonesia), a group affiliated with the 
PKI, October 13, 2002.
17 Dr. Ir. Imaduddin Abdurrahim (known as Bang Imad) taught in Malaysia in the early 1970s and was 
influenced by Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia, ABIM), an Islamic 
student movement led by Anwar Ibrahim. When he returned to Salman Mosque at the Bandung Institute 
of Technology (ITB), he became the head of the dakwah wing of the Indonesian Student Organization 
(Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI). In 1974, he broke with HMI and founded Latihan Mujahid Dakwah 
(Training for Islamic Propagation Warriors, LMD). The militant name for this dakwah movement appears 
to have been taken from an important text of the Muslim Brotherhood, Sa'id Hawwa's Fi afaq al-ta'alim. 
Abu Ridho translated this work into Indonesian with the title Membina Angkatan Mujahid (Building a 
Force/Generation of Defenders of the Faith) (Jakarta: Al-Islah, 1993). See Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena 
Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia (The Justice Party Phenomenon: 
Transformation over 20 Years of the Tarbiyah Movement in Indonesia) (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), pp. 72-73.
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Maulana Maududi. The movement taught that Islam provides a solution for all 
problems, political, social, and personal. Students in South Sumatra encountered this 
new current of "political" dakwah in the early 1990s at A1 Ghazali mosque at UNSRI. 
The most striking sign of this conception of a more authentic form of Islam was the 
adoption of the jilbab (Islamic head covering) by women students. By 1994, almost half 
the women students at UNSRI wore the jilbab, while women students at IAIN Raden 
Fatah and the Muhammadiyah University were required to do so.
The New Order response to the Islamic revival of the 1980s combined repression 
with manipulation. In 1984, the massacre of Muslim protestors from a mosque in 
Tanjung Priok, a poor area in the port of Jakarta, served warning on all Islamist 
groups. The following year, a Law on Mass Organizations required all organizations to 
accept the official government ideology, Pancasila, as their sole basis. This law forced 
Muslim organizations to give up Islam as their fundamental principle. The National 
Organization of Muslim University Students (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI) split 
over this issue, and those with Islamist sympathies formed the Council to Safeguard 
HMI (HMI Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi, HMI MPO) and went underground. Pelajar 
Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Students Association, PII), the organization of 
secondary school students formerly associated with Masyumi, also went underground. 
Branches of these underground organizations in South Sumatra attracted little notice, 
but they remained active.
Muslim activists sought ways to accommodate to the New Order while working 
for change. In the 1970s, the Social and Economic Research, Education, and 
Information Institute (Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan, dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan 
Sosial, LP3ES) started training programs and pilot development projects in rural 
pesantren (religious boarding schools) in Java. Under the leadership of Adi Sasono, the 
Institute for Development Studies (Lembaga Studi Pembangunan, LSP) promoted the 
idea of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with development agendas as the 
center of a civil society movement.18 These Islamic development-oriented NGOs 
conducted leadership-training programs for student activists in South Sumatra in the 
1990s.
The New Order established the Union of Mosque Youth (Ikatan Remaja Masjid, 
IRM) in an attempt to control political activism in Islamic youth organizations. As one 
IRM leader in Palembang explained, "Youth has [sic] a tendency to political 
involvement, but this tendency can be minimized through the involvement of Remaja 
Masjid."19 In addition, funding from charities founded by Suharto, such as Yayasan 
Dharmais, went to Islamic education programs established by local Islamic 
organizations. For example, a three-year academy for rural youth combining Islamic 
leadership training with entrepreneurial skills was established in 1989 by Yayasan
18 See Philip Eldridge, Non-Government Organisations and Democratic Participation in Indonesia (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 74-98; and Martin van Bruinessen, Universiteit Utrecht Faculty 
Homepages, "Post-Suharto Muslim engagements with civil society and democratisation,"
http: / / www.let.uu.nl/ -martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/Post_Suharto_Islam_and_civil_ 
society.htm (accessed August 2003).
19 Quotations in this section are from interviews with leaders of Remaja Masjid conducted by Widyawati 
in 1999.
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Amal Bhakti Jaya Sempurna (YABJS), a foundation in Palembang funded by Yayasan 
Dharmais.20
In the early 1990s, A1 Arqam, a quietist messianic Islamic community, was 
established in Palembang. The leader of the community, Musta'in Zamhari, was a 
charismatic preacher from Ogan Komering Ilir in South Sumatra. The community 
consisted of approximately one hundred members, most of whom were university 
students or small-scale entrepreneurs. Members adopted a version of traditional Arab 
dress: for men, long white robes and turbans; for women, a black cadar, which 
completely covered the body, and, in a few cases, a veil that covered the face. Because 
of this unusual dress, people in South Sumatra often said A1 Arqam members were 
"fanatik" (fanatical), but the community was tolerated until A1 Arqam was banned by 
the New Order in 1994. The ban was announced by the Indonesian Council of Ulama 
(Majelis Ulama Indonesia, MUI), which was used to control Islamic activism during 
the New Order.
The New Order also quietly gave its approval to an Islamic Renewal movement 
(Pembaruan) led by Nurcholish Madjid, who as president of the HMI in 1970 provoked 
heated controversy when he called for Islam to be separated from politics with the 
slogan "Islam Yes, Islamic Party No."21 The Renewal movement emphasized the 
interpretation of scripture in its application to the modern world, and the realization of 
Islamic values in personal life rather than through political parties. While some 
lecturers and students at IAIN Raden Fatah were attracted by these ideas, university 
students in South Sumatra appeared to be influenced more by the conservative Islamist 
dakwah movement. Nurcholish Madjid was criticized because he had been educated in 
the West rather than the Middle East. People said that he did not speak Arabic (which 
is incorrect) and that his teachings did not represent "true" Islam.
Despite New Order efforts to control Islamic activism, Islam was used to criticize 
the New Order. When the popular preacher KH (Kiai Haji) Zainuddin M. Z. spoke in 
Palembang in the late 1980s, he drew record crowds, delighting his audience with 
parables and jokes drawing on Islamic values to criticize the New Order in an elliptical 
fashion. He used the popular image of Islam as a compass (pedoman) that helps to direct a 
person in the right direction, and he emphasized the importance of the Islamic 
community (ummat) working together, implying that New Order elites were egotistical 
and individualist. People called him "bold" (berani) for his subtle criticism of the New 
Order.
In South Sumatra, the first student-led demonstrations of the kind that would later 
multiply to become the pro-democracy reformasi (reform) movement took place in 1994 
at UNSRI. Students protested an increase in tuition that was due to cost overruns in 
construction of a new campus, which was being built with a World Bank loan.
20 In 1997, YABJS founded an accountancy college at the outskirts of Palembang. The project was not 
successful due to the low salaries paid to teachers who were only moonlighting. In mid-1999, there were 
thirty-eight students.
21 Nurcholish Madjid's speech was entitled, "Keharusan Pembaruan Pemikiran Islam dan Masalah 
Integrasi Umat" (The Necessity of Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integration of the 
Islamic Community). An English translation of the speech can be found in Charles Kurzman, ed., Liberal 
Islam: A Sourcebook (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 284-89.
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Students accused the university administration of corruption and mismanagement, 
and they protested that poor students could not afford higher tuition. In 1994, a small 
group of students also demonstrated when the government revoked the publication 
licenses of three popular national news magazines, Tempo, Detik, and Monitor. 
Although some lecturers at UNSRI quietly supported the student protests, most people 
outside the university seemed critical. They said that the students' actions were "rather 
strong" (agak kerns) and they "smelled of politics" (berbau politik). This reaction contrasted 
with the general appreciation of the subtleties of Zainuddin M. Z.'s sermons.
As the student-led reformasi movement grew in strength following the onset of the 
Asian Economic Crisis in the summer of 1997, the network of dakwah organizations on 
university campuses (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus, LDK) throughout Indonesia joined 
the demonstrations demanding Suharto step down. In March 1998, LDK leaders 
formed the Action Committee of Indonesian Muslim Students (KAMMI). LDK activists 
in South Sumatra established a branch of KAMMI in April. They won control of the 
Student Senate (Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa, BEM) at UNSRI in the next election cycle.
In the post-Suharto period, Islamic schools have become popular with middle-class 
parents in Palembang. An Islamic elementary school with a Wahabi orientation 
established by the Mahadizzuddin Foundation, which appears to receive funding from 
Saudi sources, is now the most prestigious (and expensive) school in Palembang. At this 
school, there are also Qur'an study groups (halaqah) for adults. Another Islamic 
elementary school, Azahara, serves the middle-class suburb of Polygon. In South 
Sumatra, there are also 169 Muhammadiyah schools and 207 pesantren with over 90,000 
students. Since 2000, branches of the militant Islamic organizations, Laskar Jihad, Front 
Pembela Islam (FPI), and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) have also been 
established in South Sumatra.
In 2003, President Megawati Sukarnoputri came to Palembang to reopen Masjid 
Agung, the largest mosque in Palembang, which had been beautifully renovated over 
the last five years. The Central Bureau of Statistics for South Sumatra (Badan Pusat 
Statistik, BPS Sumsel) reports that, in addition to Masjid Agung, the province has 5,525 
mosques, 1,015 musholla (a small building or room set aside in a public place for daily 
prayer, but not used for Friday prayers), and 4,209 langgar (a neighborhood prayer 
house that is not used for Friday prayers). While the number of Islamic places of 
worship in South Sumatra increased every year between 1998 and 2001, in 2002 a 
decrease in this number was reported.22
II. Democratic Concepts and Values from an Islamic Perspective
In the last decade of the New Order, a debate over the relationship of Islam to 
democracy emerged among the leaders of Islamic organizations in Indonesia. Central 
to this debate were concepts derived from English and Arabic, including demokrasi 
(democracy), politik (politics), masyarakat sipil (a concept of civil society derived from 
Western usage), masyarakat madani (an Islamic conception of civil society), musyawarah 
(collective deliberation), mufakat or konsensus (consensus), and kader (cadre). However,
22 See BPS 2002 Sumsel Dalam Angka (Palembang: Publication of the Badan Pusat Statisk Sumsel, 2002).
Islam and the Habits of Democracy 101
these concepts do not have exactly the same meaning as their English and Arabic 
equivalents, nor do they mean the same thing in all Islamic organizations.
The Indonesian politik does not translate as "politics" in the sense of legitimate 
conflict between parties with different interests and perspectives. In the New Order, 
politik implied opposition to the government and was seen as a threat to the unity of 
the nation. As Adam Schwarz observed,
Frequent and ominous warnings about the ever-present threats to national 
unity—from, among others, communists, radical Muslims, and Westernized 
liberals—are meant to ward off moves for political change. In a society that is 
culturally comfortable with strong rule and deeply concerned with national 
unity, these warnings act as powerful disincentives to political reformation. The 
political choice available to Indonesia, Soeharto argues, is not between 
authoritarianism and democracy; it is between "Pancasila democracy"—that is, 
the status quo—and chaos.23
Even non-governmental organizations came to share this negative view of politik. 
According to Philip Eldridge, "Most NGOs feel less comfortable with any kind of 
action which can be labeled 'political' in any direct sense and . . . are at pains to define 
their role in non-political terms. Such a stance is not merely prudential but in many 
respects reflects their core values and practices."24 In post-New Order Indonesia, politik 
is most often used to refer to self-interested conflicts among elites that paralyze 
government. To say that something "smells of politics" (berbau politik) is to imply that a 
politically powerful person is manipulating a situation in their own interest.25
In Islamic organizations, the suspicion of politik as divisive and based on self- 
interest is enhanced by the value Islam traditionally places on social harmony, rule by 
consensus, and the unity of the community of Muslims (ummat). The Sunni tradition 
warns, "Keep away from actions or words that can provoke anger among other people. 
According to Islamic law, any action that can disturb the society's order is a major sin 
that will be judged by God."26 Politik and conflict are generally considered to be the 
result of egotism and placing individual interests above those of the community. The 
dakwah organizations are particularly uncomfortable with politik because of the 
emphasis they place on unity of the ummat. They tend to describe themselves as a 
moral movement (gerakan moral), despite the fact that they have political aims. Political 
activism is described as a struggle (perjuangan) to realize Islamic values rather than as 
politik, and protest demonstrations are called "actions" (aksi) to alert people to an issue. 
One of the chief activities of the youth groups of Islamic organizations is cadre training 
Ckaderisasi), which is socialization to Islamic values so that conflict is avoided and 
leadership through consensus is possible.
23 Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability (St. Leonards NSW, Australia: Allen 
and Unwin, 1999), p. 42.
24 Eldridge, Non-Government Organisations, p. 1.
25 See Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, p. 37.
26 Kiai Machrus Ali of NU, quoted by Andree Feillard, "Traditionalist Islam and the Army in Indonesia's 
New Order: The Awkward Relationship," in Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia, 
ed. Greg Fealy and Greg Barton (Clayton, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 1996), p. 58.
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In Indonesia in the 1980s, the term masyarakat sipil (civil society) was used to refer 
to the growing role of NGOs. However, when NGOs began to criticize the New Order 
regime, government officials mounted a campaign against the concept of (an 
autonomous) civil society, emphasizing the need for harmony and cooperation 
between government and social organizations. The term "NGO" was taken to imply 
opposition to the government and therefore conflict and politik. To remove the 
implication that NGOs were opposed to the government, "NGO" was translated into 
Indonesian as Self-reliant Community Organization (Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat, 
LSM). "Good" LSMs that worked with the government were called Self-reliant 
Community Organizations for Development (Lembaga Pengembangan Swadaya 
Masyarakat, LPSM). Only one of the organizations discussed in this paper, FORDS, a 
dakwah association that has a small membership and sees itself as focused on "issues" 
such as drugs, describes itself as a "kind" of LSM.
In the 1990s, Islamic organizations began to refer to an Islamic, as opposed to a 
Western, conception of civil society as masyarakat madani. This term was introduced in 
Indonesia by Nurcholish Madjid.27 For Muslims in Indonesia, masyarakat madani is 
generally understood to refer to the ideal of a harmonious society without politik, an 
Islamic community led by musyawarah (collective deliberation) in which consensus 
(■mufakat) prevails.
III. Islamic Organizations and Democratic Practices
Muhammadiyah Sumatera Selatan28
Muhammadiyah is the largest Islamic organization in South Sumatra, with fifteen 
thousand to twenty thousand card-carrying members.29 There are sixty branches and 
160 subbranches, a branch of Aisyiyah, the Muhammadiyah women's organization, 
and branches of Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah, the Muhammadiyah youth 
organization. The structure of Muhammadiyah is democratic. At the provincial level, 
Muhammadiyah is organized as a council (Pimpinan Wilayah Muhammadiyah 
SumSel, Muhammadiyah South Sumatra Regional Leadership [Council]). Local 
branches work together to organize a regional Muhammadiyah convocation 
(Musyawarah Wilayah Muhammadiyah) every five years. Officers of local branches 
are elected. They volunteer their time. Financial support for Muhammadiyah projects 
is solicited from individual members.
27 The term masyarakat madani, which is generally understood to mean "civilized society" and to refer to 
the society of Medina in the time of the prophet, was first used to refer to "civil society" by Najib Al'Atas 
and Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia. Nurcholish Madjid introduced this usage to Indonesia in 1995. See 
Nurcholish Madjid, "Menuju Masyarakat Madani," Ulumul Qur'an 2,7 (1996): 51-55, and "Kedaulatan 
Rakyat: Prinsip Kemanusiaan dan Musyawarah dalam Masyarakat Madani," in Widodo Usman, 
Membongkar Mitos Masyarakat Madani (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2000). Michael Laffan (personal 
communication) notes that, in the Middle East, Islamist opponents of an autonomous civil society as 
distinct from government also use Medina as their defining model, but they refer to it as al-mujtama' al- 
islami (Islamic society).
28 Umar Abdullah assisted in collecting data on Muhammadiyah in South Sumatra.
29 See Muhammad Fuad, "Civil Society in Indonesia: The Potential and Limits of Muhammadiyah," 
Sojourn 17,2 (October 2002): 133-163.
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In accord with the Quranic injunction "to do good and refrain from evil" (amar 
ma'rufnahi munkar), the goal of Muhammadiyah is to contribute to society. They focus 
on seven areas: preaching, religious law, education, health and social welfare, training 
of cadre, religious foundations and charities, and economic development. The 
accomplishments of Muhammadiyah in South Sumatra are impressive. They include 
the establishment and management of seven orphanages, a maternity hospital, five 
clinics, five health posts for mothers and children, four professional academies, 169 
schools with religious instruction, a Muhammadiyah hospital, and the 
Muhammadiyah University in Palembang. In 2002, Muhammadiyah opened a new 
Teacher Training Institute in Pagar Alam, which had over four hundred students in 
2004. The newest project is an auditorium at the Muhammadiyah University in 
Palembang that would seat one thousand people.
Muhammadiyah leaders in Palembang are proposing reforms that would make 
their organization more "professional." They would like to reduce dependence on 
voluntarism because officers with full-time jobs cannot implement projects as 
effectively as they would like. They point out that the Muhammadiyah Public Hospital 
in Palembang, which opened in 1995, took nearly thirty years to complete. They plan to 
establish a member insurance program that would provide the funding for a paid staff.
The chairman of the Palembang Branch of Muhammadiyah, Drs. Romli, AS, was 
formerly Dean of the Religion Faculty at the Muhammadiyah University in Palembang 
and is now an Assistant Rector at IAIN Raden Fatah. Romli emphasizes that 
Muhammadiyah is not a "political" organization.30 He points out that Partai Amanat 
Nasional (National Mandate Party, PAN), the political party established by former 
Muhammadiyah chairman Amien Rais for the 1999 election, is not structurally tied to 
Muhammadiyah. Members are free to join any political party, and, Romli says, they 
should not bring their political differences into Muhammadiyah. Romli defines politics 
as a vehicle for individuals to pursue their particular interests and views, whereas the 
mission of Muhammadiyah is to create a more just Islamic society. If people 
understand this mission as political, he maintains, they are wrong. An Islamic society 
is grounded in an Islamic family, and an Islamic family will be realized by Islamic 
individuals. In his view, the term "Islamic state" (negara Islam), which some people 
understand as referring to a country governed by Islamic law, simply refers to a nation 
where the majority of people are Muslims. In that sense, Indonesia is already an 
Islamic state. Romli points out that there is a great variety of cultural forms of Islamic 
civilization, and, in his view, Islam supports democracy because Islam is an open 
teaching that anyone can understand.
Despite the success of Muhammadiyah in South Sumatra, Romli is concerned that 
Muhammadiyah schools have neglected moral education, so that people no longer 
consider Muhammadiyah educational institutions superior to other schools. He is 
promoting a plan to add Arabic and moral education to the curriculum. He is also 
concerned about inculcating the tradition of social activism in a younger generation of 
Muhammadiyah activists. He points out that the Muhammadiyah youth organizations
30 "Politik Jangan Dibawa ke Muhammadiyah" (Don't Bring Politics Into Muhammadiyah), Sriwijaya Post, 
December 12, 2001.
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do not conduct as many activities now as they did during the New Order.31 Younger 
Muhammadiyah leaders have become involved in political parties and been nominated 
to the local election boards, KPU (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, General Elections 
Commission) and PANWASLU (Panitia Pengawas Pemilu, Election Supervisory 
Committee), set up for the 2004 elections. However, Romli's concern that members are 
not as involved in Muhammadiyah's projects now as during the New Order can be 
viewed from another perspective. One could say that Muhammadiyah has prepared its 
members for political engagement in a democratizing country. Its members have 
adopted civic values that motivate engagement in the public sphere, and they have 
experience engaging in collective social action in the form of civic projects.
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)32
In South Sumatra, people in villages are likely to identify with NU, although they 
probably would not be official members of the organization. Therefore, one could 
argue that NU and Muhammadiyah are equally strong in the province, with 
Muhammadiyah strongest in urban areas and NU in rural areas. This difference is 
expressed in the more progressive organization of Muhammadiyah as compared with 
the more traditional orientation of NU, which emphasizes respect for authority. Under 
the New Order, NU tended to cooperate with the government and in return received 
modest government funding for its programs. One member explained, "NU's program 
does not clash with that of the government but helps to improve the welfare of 
Indonesian people." Throughout the 1990s, there was little turnover in the local 
leadership of NU. Bureaucratic organization was minimal. There were no formal 
reports on activities, and operational expenses, like electricity and fax, were funded by 
NU officers out of their own pockets. The activities sponsored by NU included 
religious education, charity, a women's organization, a youth organization, a martial 
arts group, and mosque building.
The selection of national NU leader Abdurrahman Wahid (affectionately known as 
Gus Dur) as president of Indonesia in 1999 reinvigorated NU leaders at the local level 
with the prospect of increased financial support. In January 2000, religious teachers 
(ulama) attending a provincial NU congress in South Sumatra set forth three goals for 
the succeeding five years: 1) clarify the duties of officers; 2) strengthen existing 
programs, many of which were inactive; and 3) establish an NU university in 
Palembang. A committee of eleven people was established to oversee these projects; 
five were new to the NU Board of Directors.
The NU Board set up a foundation, Yayasan Universitas Nahdlatul Ulama, to take 
on the task of raising funds for the new university. But before the project was well 
under way, a dispute emerged between the NU Board and the foundation directors 
over who would appoint the rector of the new university. NU leaders were not able to 
resolve this disagreement and make further progress. After the fall of President
31 Author's interview with Drs. Romli, AS, Chairman of the Palembang Branch of Muhammadiyah, 
August 1, 2004.
32 Adang Yuliansyah assisted in collecting data on NU. Quotations in this section are taken from 
interviews he conducted with NU leaders in 1999.
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Abdurrahman Wahid, the Department of Education required that the proposed 
university be redesigned, and local NU leaders abandoned the project. However, NU 
leaders succeeded in building a new headquarters in Palembang with funds collected 
from local sources.
There are two factions within NU in South Sumatra. A group of younger members 
wants change, stressing the challenge of globalization and the need to establish a more 
rational, bureaucratic organizational structure for NU. This group wants NU to 
become a vehicle for spreading pluralist values. On the other side are senior NU 
leaders who view tradition and the authority of religious teachers (kiai) as the source of 
a stable and moral society. They do not think that a change in leadership style or the 
promotion of more democratic interaction within NU is necessary. They acknowledge 
that often they do not have time to perform optimally in their roles in NU because of 
the pressure of regular jobs, and that management of NU is not "modern." But they 
approach change cautiously, frequently referring to the need to "preserve traditions 
that are good and take on new ideas that are better."33 The ferment in NU can also be 
seen in NU pesantren like Ittifaquiah where there is a diversity of viewpoints, ranging 
from militants supporting the radical Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia to liberal 
intellectuals who support democratic values and promote dialogue among groups 
with different viewpoints.34
There were two candidates in the 1999 election of a new NU chairman for South 
Sumatra. The first, the head of a pesantren, could be said to represent a traditional 
(pesantren-based) leadership style, while the second from the IAIN represented a new 
generation of Islamic intellectuals trained in Western-style academic institutions. The 
more progressive candidate was elected. Emphasizing the importance of avoiding 
conflict, an NU leader pointed out that the two candidates have worked together 
harmoniously since the election.
In 2000, the relationship between NU and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National 
Awakening Party, PKB), the political party formed by NU Chairman Abdurrahman 
Wahid in 1999, was another source of conflict within NU. As criticism of Abdurrahman 
Wahid mounted in the initial months of his presidency, some NU leaders called for 
loyalty to the president, emphasizing the problems faced by the new government and 
the power of entrenched interests associated with Suharto. Others sought to distance 
NU from the PKB. By 2004, however, NU leaders in South Sumatra had accepted that 
NU membership was divided politically, supporting not only parties with Islam as a 
basis—PKB, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, PPP), and 
Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent Moon Star Party, PBB), but also "secular" 
parties—Golkar (whose vice-presidential candidate was from NU), the new Demokrasi 
Partai (DP) of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (which also had a vice-presidential 
candidate from NU), and Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (The Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle, PDI-P), with former NU chairman Hasyim Muzadi as its 
vice-presidential candidate. The NU chairman in South Sumatra, Drs. Malan 
Abdullahi, saw the depolitization of NU as an advantage because members were now
33 The reference to preserving good traditions and taking on better new ideas is often cited in NU circles.
34 Observation of Rick Kraince, November 2003.
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more likely to focus on NU projects.35 He pointed to new agricultural development 
projects and youth activities being developed in villages where people are "culturally
NU."
Islamic Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI)36
The Palembang branch of HMI was established in 1955. It has seventeen 
subbranches (komisariat), which are located in the faculties of Sriwijaya University, 
IAIN Raden Fatah, the Muhammadiyah University, and other private universities in 
Palembang. Komisariat with full memberships (fifty members) have voting rights; smaller 
komisariat have the right to speak at branch meetings. In Palembang, ten komisariat have 
voting rights and seven have the right to speak. New members are recruited by each 
komisariat.
HMI members describe the manner of decision making in HMI as consensual 
(budaya musyawarah mufakat). Before the election of an HMI-Palembang chairman, 
leaders try to win support for a sole candidate (kandidat tunggal). Frequently, however, 
komisariat compete fiercely to elect their own candidate. If consensus among the 
komisariat is not achieved, voting and majority rule are used.
According to HMI leaders in Palembang, the primary role of HMI is to provide 
leadership training (latihan kepemimpinan or kaderisasi) to Muslim university students. 
During the Suharto era, HMI became a training ground for students with political 
ambitions. A network of HMI alumni developed, linking elites in all the major political 
parties. This led to the development of a distinctive political culture in HMI. As one 
HMI-Palembang member explained, "HMI is an important organization for 
establishing networks. Your university no longer matters—you are all HMI." 
However, outsiders have described HMI as elitist and as having a "patron-client" 
culture through the strong HMI alumni association (Korps Alumni HMI, KAHMI).
In 1996, when pro-democracy students occupied the headquarters of the Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia (The Indonesian Democratic Party, PDI) in Jakarta in support of 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, two factions emerged in HMI-Palembang. The HMI-progresif 
faction, located in the Faculty of Economics komisariat at UNSRI, wanted to move HMI 
away from support of the New Order to a more critical position. They objected to the 
kaderisasi prescribed by the national HMI, arguing that it was a rigid (kaku) 
indoctrination. They decided to provide their own training to fourteen new members. 
On the final day of this training, the officer in charge of kaderisasi for HMI-Palembang 
declared the training invalid because it did not accord with national guidelines. This 
announcement almost led to a violent confrontation between officers of HMI- 
Palembang and the progresif faction, but a negotiation was arranged. The new recruits 
in the progresif komisariat were allowed to complete their training, but were not given 
official certificates by HMI-Palembang.
35 Author's interview with Drs. Malan Abdullahi, the chairman of the South Sumatra Branch of NU, 
August 2, 2004.
36 Dian Novita, Azimi Asnawi, and Robby Puruhitu assisted in collecting data on HMI.
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The incipient split between HMI-Palembang and the progresif faction deepened the 
following year when the progresif komisariat carried out another training of ten new 
members. The HMI-Palembang executive committee put three officers of the komisariat 
on probation. It also reported the conflict to the regional military command (Komando 
Daerah Militer, KODAM), objecting that the members of HMI-progresif should not be 
allowed to use the name HMI. The HMI-progresif faction was put under military 
surveillance.
In 1997, HMI-Palembang and the progresif komisariat elected new chairmen who 
negotiated a compromise between the two factions. HMI-Palembang would accept the 
training conducted by the progresif komisariat at UNSRI, and the progresif faction would 
be allowed to set up a new division to discuss political and economic issues. Progresif 
leaders felt that this opened up a new space in HMI-Palembang for discussion of the 
issues they wished to raise.
As the student-led reformasi movement emerged, HMI-Palembang began to move 
away from support for the government. In 1997, HMI-Palembang withdrew from the 
National Committee of Indonesian Youth (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, KNPI), 
a government-sponsored umbrella organization for youth groups. In 1998, HMI- 
Palembang joined with other Islamic student organizations—KAMMI, Pelajar Islam 
Indonesia (PII), a Muhammadiyah Youth Group (Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah, 
IMM), the Student Forum for Masyarakat Madani (Forum Mahasiswa untuk 
Masyarakat Madani, FORMAD), and the Plaju Islamic Youth Union (Ikatan Pemuda 
Islam Plaju, IPIP)—to form the Islamic Young Generation (Generasi Mudah Islam, 
Gemuis). Gemuis was to coordinate the strategy of Islamic student organizations in 
support of reformasi.37
After the fall of Suharto, in the lead-up to the twenty-second National Congress of 
HMI (November-December 1999), HMI alumni, who were prominent national political 
leaders, provided support to particular candidates running for the office of national 
chairman of HMI.38 This led to accusations by the progresif faction that HMI was being 
co-opted by Jakarta elites who "polluted" (mencemari) the moral basis of the student 
movement and turned it into a "political" movement aimed at supporting their 
interests (yang sangat pragmatis).39 In Palembang the leader of the progresif faction 
ousted his opponent, who was criticized for his failure to deal with the split in HMI- 
Palembang, his rigid style of leadership, and his failure to present a satisfactory 
account of HMI finances.
At the National Congress, where the role of HMI in the reformasi era was debated, 
HMI-Palembang argued that the statement of HMI values, Nilai Identitas Kader 
(Fundamental Values of Cadre, NIK), formulated in 1985 under pressure from New 
Order legislation on mass organizations, did not provide guidance on how to
37 Gemuis did not survive the reformasi campaign. In early 2000, when a demonstration against the national 
electricity company was organized to protest frequent blackouts in Palembang, KAMMI and IPIP dropped 
out, accusing Gemuis leaders of being manipulated by political figures.
38 The election campaign of M. Fakhruddin (from Aceh) as national HMI Chairman is said to have received 
financial support from Akbar Tandjung. Fuad Bawazier, chairman of the HMI Alumni Association, is also 
said to have funded candidates in HMI elections.
39 Author's interview with Robby Puruhita, leader of the progresif faction, June 2001.
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implement Islamic values. They proposed that HMI return to Islam as a fundamental 
principle (nilai dasar perjuangan) and the NIK be replaced with a new statement, to be 
known as the Principles of Islamic Struggle (Nilai Jihad Kader). This proposal was 
passed. The newly elected national chairman of HMI supported HMI-Palembang in its 
reformasi actions, such as withdrawing from the KNPI.
Under progresif leadership, HMI-Palembang began to take stands on political 
issues. In January 2000, it passed a resolution denouncing the "oppression" and 
"slaughter" of Muslims in Ambon and demanded that the Indonesian army stop 
attacks on Muslims in Aceh. The government of Abdurrahman Wahid was urged to 
take action to prevent chaos on a national level. According to progresif leaders, they 
were attempting to "clarify" national issues, not engaging in politik.
HMI-Palembang also joined with other student organizations—the Student Senates 
of UNSRI, Universitas Muhammadiyah, and IAIN Raden Fatah—to form the Alliance 
of Environmental Concern (Aliansi Peduli Lingkungan, APEL). APEL pushed for the 
creation of a green belt on the coast of South Sumatra and the preservation of 
mangrove swamps that were being destroyed by smallholders building shrimp ponds. 
However, their involvement in an APEL demonstration precipitated the ouster of the 
progresif faction from the leadership of Palembang-HMI. Opponents of the progresif 
faction on the HMI-Palembang Board argued that HMI was being manipulated by 
political interests. They pointed out that the idea for the demonstration at the 
governor's office had come from an HMI alumnus who worked for PT. Wachyuni 
Mandira (PT WM), a conglomerate that had built extensive industrial shrimp farms in 
Lampung and South Sumatra and was owned by the Suharto crony Nursalim. They 
said that PT WM was using HMI to mount a campaign against traditional shrimp 
farmers because mud from ponds built by independent smallholders washed inland, 
damaging PT WM ponds. The opponents of the progresif faction threatened to 
withdraw from HMI-Palembang if the environmental campaign was not abandoned.
With support from the local HMI alumni association, KAHMI, conservative 
opponents of the progresif faction established the Council to Rescue the Palembang 
Branch (Majelis Penyelamat Cabang, MPC). They issued a statement demanding that 
the progresif chairman of HMI stand down, pointing out that he had not received the 
training mandated by the national HMI constitution (because he was trained by the 
progresif komisariat). They accused him of being "not Islamic" (tidak Islami) and turning 
HMI-Palembang into a non-governmental organization (LSM), which could become 
the tool of individual interests. They also objected because he had joined the reformasi 
organization, South Sumatra Corruption Watch.
Supporters of HMI -progresif maintained that HMI had become an empty symbol 
(simbol saja) of Islam with no content, while they had created a new atmosphere in 
HMI-Palembang aimed at concrete Islamic action (kerja kongkrit agama Islam). If the 
HMI constitution hindered action, they argued, the constitution should be changed. 
The komisariat in Palembang were not able to resolve the deadlock over whether the 
progresif chairman should step down. When one komisariat opposing the progresif 
faction walked out of the meeting, the progresif chairman agreed to step down. He 
explained that if he continued in office, efforts to unseat him would go on and threaten 
the unity of the organization. Many other members of the progresif faction also 
withdrew from HMI and joined student reformasi organizations.
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Two candidates emerged to replace the progresif chairman. The more conservative 
candidate was elected. Several komisariat abstained from voting because they did not 
fully support the candidate who won, but they felt the other candidate was not 
qualified. Before accepting office, the new chairman asked each komisariat to guarantee 
that he would be supported so long as his actions followed the HMI constitution.
Two Dakwah Organizations: Remaja Masjid and Forum Dakwah Sekolah (FORDS)40
The Islamic Mission for Youth Education (Pendidikan Remaja Masjid Taqwa, 
PERMATA), a dakwah organization based in a mosque in a middle-class neighborhood 
in Palembang, was established in 1982.41 PERMATA was modeled on the Mosque 
Youth Communication Forum (Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Masjid Indonesia, BKPMI), 
founded in 1977 in Bandung, West Java by a group of young Islamic activists to combat 
the activity of Christian missionaries and resist the secularization that accompanied 
modernization. The founding members of BKPMI had close ties to the Suharto 
regime,42 but their organization was closely monitored by the Indonesian military, 
especially after a Muslim riot in Tanjung Priok was violently suppressed by the 
military in 1984. The founders of PERMATA in Palembang initially debated whether to 
establish formal ties to BKPMI. When they did join BKPMI in 1983, they found that 
their activities were circumscribed. For example, when they invited Imaduddin 
Abdurrahim, the charismatic dakwah preacher from Salman Mosque in Bandung, to 
come to Palembang, the military denied permission for his visit.
In the 1990s, when the New Order began to cultivate support from Islamic 
organizations, the Ministry of Religion turned to BKPMI to establish a national 
organization of Islamic youth groups. This was called Ikatan Remaja Masjid (Union of 
Mosque Youth). Six areas of activity were authorized for Remaja Masjid: 1) religious 
education for young people; 2) Islamic preschools; 3) human resource development 
programs; 4) entrepreneurial development programs; 5) Islamic Scouts; and 6) family 
welfare programs.
Remaja Masjid has a top-down orientation, and local branches have limited 
autonomy. At the provincial level, there is a Remaja Masjid Council with formal 
autonomy, but in practice the National Council in Jakarta must approve all new 
activities. District Remaja Masjid groups must get approval from the Provincial Remaja 
Masjid Council for their activities. However, the formal structure of Remaja Masjid is 
democratic, with a leadership council in each branch consisting of three officers elected 
for a term of three years and serving for no longer than two terms. According to 
members in Palembang, leaders are selected for their Islamic learning.
40 Widyawati and Ahmad Fali Okhlilas assisted in collecting data on Remaja Masjid and FORDS.
41 Taqwa is usually translated as "piety" or "obedience." Farid Esack defines it as "self-restraint in the 
awareness that one is always in the presence of God and ultimately accountable to him." Farid Esack, The 
Qur'an: A Short Introduction (Oxford: One World Publications, 2002), p. 187.
42 Founders of BKPMI include Jimly Asshiddiqie (from South Sumatra) and Toto Tasmara, who was close 
to Tommy Suharto and served as Director of FIUMPUSS, a corporation owned by Bambang Suharto. In 
1990, they were founding members of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia, the Association of 
Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals), an organization formed in 1990 with permission from President Suharto, 
who was courting Muslim support. In 1998, they helped to form the Islamic party, Partai Bulan Bintang.
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In 1992, Remaja Masjid organized the first mosque-based dakwah programs in 
Islamic spiritual training (kerohanian Islam, or Rohis) for high school students in 
Palembang. With the endorsement of Remaja Masjid by the Suharto regime, dakwah 
groups could organize more freely and received funding from local and provincial 
governments. Remaja Masjid claims that 17,087 children in South Sumatra have 
graduated from their Qur'an reading classes.
According to a former chairman of Remaja Masjid in Palembang, when the New 
Order provided funding (gula, literally sugar) during the 1990s, Remaja Masjid lost the 
solidarity and dedication that characterized it in the 1980s. When funding dried up 
with the fall of Suharto, Remaja Masjid found it had difficulty recruiting new leaders 
and members. Forced to find new sources of funding, Remaja Masjid has developed a 
successful commercial enterprise selling Islamic clothes, cosmetics, devotional tapes, 
and books. This initiative led to a conflict with the authorities of the mosque in 
Palembang, where the Remaja Masjid office was housed. The mosque leaders protested 
that Remaja Masjid did not pay rent for the use of the mosque facilities, although it 
received a profit from the Islamic clothing and tapes it sold. The Remaja Masjid 
chairman then proposed to move the Remaja Masjid office to his home. Some members 
resisted because they suspected that the chairman was diverting Remaja Masjid funds 
to his own pocket, but they were not able to voice their objection without proof. The 
Remaja Masjid office was initially moved to the chairman's house, but the successful 
establishment of a Remaja Masjid shop in a building on the main street in Palembang 
allowed for a second move.
The commercial success of Remaja Masjid and the greater freedom of the post-New 
Order era led leaders to propose a program of new activities in 2000. The South 
Sumatra Remaja Masjid Provincial Council decided to initiate programs in six areas: 1) 
human rights, law, and environment; 2) research and education; 3) communication and 
membership; 4) publication, documentation, and public relations; 5) culture and sports; 
and 6) international and organizational linkages.
Remaja Masjid officers say that one of the main goals of their organization is to 
bring diverse Islamic groups together. Most officers in Palembang are from an NU 
background, but they stress that they maintain political neutrality between NU and 
Muhammadiyah. They strive to stand above "politics." When conflict emerged 
between supporters of different political parties in the lead-up to the 1999 election, the 
Remaja Masjid council tried to deal with the tension by reaffirming the organization's 
commitment to Islamic mission (dakwah) and the training of Islamic cadre.
In response to accusations that the organization has political (Islamist) goals, they 
point out that the national council of Remaja Masjid (Badan Komunikasi Pemuda 
Remaja Masjid Indonesia, BKPRMI) did not join the pro-democracy demonstrations 
that brought down Suharto. Nor did BKPRMI support the actions of the Islamic 
Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) against nightclubs in Jakarta (although 
these were considered to be "moral" protests). However, this argument is 
disingenuous. In 1998, BKPRMI, which is based at the Istiqlal Mosque in central 
Jakarta, was involved in organizing the paramilitary volunteers (pam swakarsa) who 
were brought to the National Parliament to confront pro-democracy students opposing 
a Habibie presidency. In 2000, BKPRMI also supported demonstrations against 
President Abdurrahman Wahid, accusing him of corruption and demanding that he act
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to defend Muslims under attack in Maluku. However, officially, Remaja Masjid in 
South Sumatra did not take any position on these issues, and they claim that members 
joined these demonstrations as individuals.
Remaja Masid officers claim that their organization is democratic. However, this 
seems to mean that there is consensus over the goals of the organization, not that 
procedures for governing the organization are democratic. Members say that the 
Provincial Council for South Sumatra no longer has regular meetings (despite a 
constitutional requirement), and they complain that policy decisions are made without 
consultation.
Another Palembang dakwah group, Forum Dakwah Sekolah (FORDS), was 
established in 1998 in the Al-Ghazali Mosque of UNSRI. FORDS received financial 
support in small amounts from the Al-Ghazali Foundation, the mayor of Palembang, 
government-owned corporations (Badan Usaha Milik Negara), local businesses, 
individual donors (primarily staff of UNSRI), and members. In 1999, FORDS had 
twenty-five male and fourteen female officers (all from UNSRI and most from the 
Faculty of Technology) and 118 members.
According to FORDS leaders, their organization is democratic. They say that 
demokrasi means discussion and consensus (musyawarah). The chairman of FORDS is 
not chosen by election, but by acclaim, and members say that religious learning is the 
most important qualification for a leader. When a new leader is to be selected, 
everyone writes the name of his or her choice on a piece of paper. In February 2000, 
three people received votes; however the person with the most votes excused himself, 
saying that he did not have enough time to take on the responsibility. The other two 
candidates also withdrew. This led the leadership council to pass a new rule requiring 
that the chairman be from a class that had graduated from university in the previous 
three years. On this basis, a candidate was selected (not elected).
The emphasis on religious authority and unity in FORDS is striking. Like members 
of most dakwah groups, FORDS members wear "proper Islamic dress," long-sleeved 
loose shirts of cotton and long pants (never jeans) for men, and loose blouses with long 
sleeves, long skirts or pants, and the jilbab for women. They use Islamic greetings and 
Arabic terms in discussions of religion. They stress the importance of the five daily 
prayers and other ritual observances. In their conformity, FORDS exemplifies the 
solidarity that in their view is expected of an Islamic community.
Members of FORDS maintain that "politics and religion are one and the same." 
They describe FORDS as an LSM that is not political, implying that FORDS seeks to 
improve society without opposing the government. They explain that as individuals, 
members often join protests that could be considered political, such as demonstrations 
organized by KAMMI and the Anti-Communist and Anti-Israel Islamic Forum (Forum 
Ummat Islam Anti-Komunis dan Israel), but FORDS's name is not used in these 
protests.
One of FORDS's major goals is to deal with issues that divide the Muslim 
community and to bring NU and Muhammadiyah together. As one spokesman put it, 
"Don't magnify the differences; why not join together, there must be solidarity."43
43 Quotations are from interviews conducted by Ahmad Fali Okhlilas, 1999.
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FORDS leaders in Palembang were particularly proud of a demonstration against 
Israel that they had organized at the South Sumatra Provincial Legislature. The protest 
brought together students from different Islamic organizations. Key members of 
parliament who had previously been informed of the demonstration came out to 
receive the protestors. FORDS leaders contrasted this peaceful protest with the 
demonstrations of reformasi protestors who were met by police or security forces.
However, in the view of students from reformasi organizations, FORDS is political. 
They say that FORDS is a tool to recruit youth to the new Islamic political party, Partai 
Keadilan (Justice Party, now known as the Justice and Prosperity Party, Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS). The head of PKS in South Sumatra is very close to the leaders 
of FORDS, who agree that PKS and FORDS share the same vision and mission. But 
FORDS, they say, has only a "moral tie" with PKS.
FORDS leaders are concerned with a decline of interest in dakwah training. Dakwah 
programs sponsored by FORDS in September and November 1999 were well attended. 
However, since then, dakwah activities have declined. FORDS leaders believe that 
members are now too busy with other concerns, and they complain that school 
administrators no longer support dakwah programs, preferring to promote activities 
like scouting.
Action Committee of Indonesian Muslim Students (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim
Indonesia, KAMMI)44
KAMMI was established in March 1998 as a national organization of Muslim 
students from the network of campus-based dakwah groups (LDK) to support the pro­
democracy reformasi movement. KAMMI-South Sumatra was established in April by 
activists at Sriwijaya University and IAIN Raden Fatah. KAMMI recruits members 
from campus prayer-houses (musholla). Funding comes from donations collected from 
members and prominent individuals in Palembang known for their support of Islamic 
causes. In 2000, KAMMI claimed to have given training (pelatihan kaderisasi) to eight 
hundred students in South Sumatra. In the brief period since its founding, KAMMI has 
become the largest Islamic student organization in the province, surpassing HMI in 
membership.
According to its mission statement, KAMMI is to train leaders for the struggle to 
establish an Islamic society through social service and political education. The reform 
of society is to be accomplished through individual commitment to Islamic values. 
Coordination of the dakwah campaign is provided by nationally elected leaders and 
implemented by regional executive boards composed of representatives from campus- 
based dakwah groups. Regional councils may organize their own aksi, but they must 
receive approval from the center. KAMMI sees its centralized power structure and 
disciplined solidarity as a source of strength. Andi Rahmat, a Jakarta-based KAMMI 
activist, believes this solidarity exemplifies the Islamic concept of wala', "rendering 
one's loyalty and willingness to be led."45
44 Robby Puruhitu, Aswendi, and Djayadi Hanan contributed information about KAMMI-Palembang.
45 "Analysis of Muslim Student Groups," The Jakarta Post, February 20, 2001.
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Like members of other dakzvah organizations, KAMMI members are concerned with 
the outward signs of Islamic commitment, such as reciting daily prayers and wearing 
Islamic dress, including the jilbab. This is a sign of the solidarity they value. KAMMI- 
organized demonstrations are noted for their discipline. During the reformasi 
demonstrations, the orderly columns of students dressed in white with green scarves 
were a favorite subject of photographers, countering the view that student protests 
were a disruptive force which would only bring conflict and chaos. KAMMI's first 
chairman, Fahri Hamzah, explained,
We have a moral stance. If there is a group that desires to cause a disturbance, 
please, they are welcome to leave our ranks . . . We are able to guard the 
coordination of mass action of thousands of people. Not just action together in 
big cities like Jakarta, Bogor, Yogyakarta, and Surabaya, but also actions in 
smaller cities like Purwokerto and Pasuruan have been implemented by KAMMI 
in an orderly manner—even in areas that are sensitive to conflict.46
For KAMMI, the struggle for democracy is a struggle for Islam, for democracy 
means majority rule, which should lead to an Islamic-oriented government in 
Indonesia. KAMMI is committed to nonviolent protest in support of democracy, but 
where Muslims are threatened, KAMMI takes the position that violence may be 
required in the defense of Islam. In the spring of 1999, after Christian-Muslim riots 
broke out in Ambon, KAMMI responded enthusiastically to the call for jihad. KAMMI 
supporters, wearing their distinctive uniforms and marching in disciplined formations 
under the flag of Partai Keadilan (now PKS), were major participants in the mass jihad 
rally that took place in Yogyakarta in March 1999.
Members maintain that KAMMI is a moral rather than a political movement. Yet 
KAMMI was at the forefront of groups demanding that President Abdurrahman 
Wahid step down from the presidency or be impeached for his alleged involvement in 
corruption and mismanagement of crises confronting Indonesia. KAMMI leaders 
explain that the purpose of such aksi is to "call attention to" national issues, like 
Brunei-gate, a scandal involving accountability for funds given to President 
Abdurrahman Wahid by the Sultan of Brunei. However, critics of KAMMI from HMI 
report rumors that Fuad Bawazier, former minister of finance in Suharto's last cabinet, 
disbursed Rp.300,000,000 ($30,000) to bring students to Jakarta for a demonstration 
against Abdurrahman Wahid on January 29, 2001.47 They argue that KAMMI is being 
manipulated by political elites.
In Palembang, KAMMI demonstrations in January and February 2001, demanding 
that President Abdurrahman Wahid step down or be impeached, attracted from two 
hundred to five hundred students. KAMMI in Palembang has also organized 
demonstrations against gambling, drugs, prostitution, and pornography. Local
46 "Kami tak menyulut kerusuhan" (We don't ignite riots), Gatra, May 16,1998, pp. 32-33, quoted in 
Richard Kraince, "The Role of Islamic Student Activists in Divergent Movements for Reform during 
Indonesia's Transition from Authoritarian Rule, 1998-2001" (PhD dissertation, Ohio University, 2002), 
p. 176.
47 "Aksi Itu Dibiayai Fuad Bawazier" (Demonstration Funded by Fuad Bawazier), Tempo Interactif, 
February 25, 2001. Fuad Bawazier, who is a member of the Presidium of KAHMI, the alumni organization 
of HMI, is said also to have funded HMI to support demonstrations against President Abdurrahman 
Wahid.
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government officials have tended to look with favor upon these orderly KAMMI 
demonstrations over "social issues" in contrast to demonstrations in support of 
workers and peasants organized by secular pro-democracy organizations, such as the 
Legal Aid Society (LBH, Lembaga Bantuan Hukum) and the Environmental Forum 
(WALHI, Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia).
There is overlap in the membership of HMI and KAMMI in Palembang, but there is 
also competition between the two organizations. KAMMI members criticize HMI as 
elitist because it is exclusive in its recruitment of members and has strong ties to 
established political elites in Jakarta. HMI members say that KAMMI, like FORDS, is a 
channel for recruiting and training cadres for the Islamist political party, PKS. They say 
that KAMMI is exclusive and does not engage in dialogue with other student groups 
with different views. KAMMI members say that Islam provides an answer to all 
problems, so debate and discussion are not necessary. If there are differences of 
opinion within the Islamic community, people should focus on their (vertikal) 
relationship to Allah and the differences will no longer be important. In contrast, HMI 
prides itself on open and free debate of issues, even of questions having to do with 
Islam.
The Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI)48
The Islamic Defenders Front was founded by Al-Habib Muhammad Rizieq Syihab 
(Habib Rizieq) in Petamburan, a neighborhood of Jakarta where Christian-Muslim riots 
broke out in December 1998. The name of the founder, "Habib," denotes someone who 
is a descendent of the Prophet, and FPI is based in the Hadrami "Arab" community of 
Jakarta. In September 1999, FPI was mobilized to support the new President B. J. 
Habibie when pro-democracy student demonstrators protested that his presidency was 
an extension of the New Order. FPI was also mobilized against students protesting the 
passage of new security laws that would give emergency powers to the armed forces.49 
FPI supports the application of Islamic law (shari'a), and it is best known for its attacks 
on Jakarta nightclubs and bars that "promote vice."
The Palembang branch of FPI was established in 2000 by Dr. Usman Said, a dakwah 
preacher at the A1 Ghazali Mosque. KAMMI and the Muhammadiyah Youth Group 
(Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah, IMM) also supported the establishment of a local 
branch of FPI. As in Jakarta, FPI draws its members primarily from the community of 
people of Arab descent long established in South Sumatra. FPI is also closely associated 
with two NU religious boarding schools, Pesantren Ittifaqiah and Pesantren Darul 
Ulum, in Ogan Komering Ilir, a rural district south of Palembang.50
48 Robby Puruhita, Umar Abdullah, and Arief Nurhayat collected data on Front Pembela Islam and Majelis 
Mujahahidin Islam in South Sumatra.
49 "Warga Betawi Long March Semanggi-Bundaran HI Dijaga Barisan Pendukung Habibie" (The Long 
March of the Betawi from Semanggi to Hotel Indonesia in Support of Habibie), Suara Merdeka, October 4, 
1999; "Pemuda Front Pembela Islam Bakar Gereja di Depok" (FPI Youth Burn Church in Depok), STAR, 
November 5,1999.
50 Misbahul Anam, one of FPI's founders in Jakarta, is an NU leader. He has since resigned from FPL
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In October of 2001, FPI in South Sumatra claimed to have over eight hundred 
members. FPI is organized as a paramilitary group with a command structure. 
However, according to student activists who joined FPI, there is rivalry between 
different habib who have their own followers, so in actuality there is no unitary 
command.
FPI cooperated with KAMMI in organizing demonstrations over the "slaughter" of 
Muslims in Ambon. These two organizations also mounted a demonstration against 
the United States protesting the anticipated attack on Afghanistan after September 11, 
2001, which attracted about four hundred people. FPI claimed to have recruited one 
hundred jihad volunteers in Palembang who were ready to fight in Afghanistan.
FPI, KAMMI, HMI, and South Sumatra Corruption Watch (SSCW) joined forces to 
campaign against gambling in South Sumatra. This campaign was aimed at the 
governor of South Sumatra, who was raising money to finance the building of a sports 
stadium and other facilities for the National Sports Competition (Pekan Olahraga 
Nasional, PON) to be held in Palembang in 2004. The protestors said that the money 
was being donated by people involved in gambling and that the governor was taking a 
cut from funds collected to finance his reelection in 2003. This campaign was an 
extension of protests launched by SSCW accusing the governor of nepotism and 
corruption in the awarding of tenders for the support of athletes from South Sumatra 
who participated in the 2000 PON.51 However, after meeting with the governor, FPI 
withdrew from the campaign.
This provoked student activists involved in the campaign to protest to the national 
FPI leadership in Jakarta, but they were told that it was not ethical (tidak etis) for 
national leaders to become involved in an internal conflict in a local branch. The 
students were advised to collect signatures on a petition to oust the head of FPI in 
Palembang. Shortly thereafter, in June 2001, preman (gangs associated with protection 
rackets and generally attached to the military or political elites who provide "backing" 
[beking] for them) attacked the offices of both the Sriwijaya Post, which had printed 
articles detailing accusations against the governor, and HMI, where further 
demonstrations were being planned. The police failed to show up until after the 
marauders had left. This brought the protests and accusations against the governor to 
an end.
In the aftermath of these events, activists from KAMMI and HMI began to distance 
themselves from FPI. In private, they suggested that the head of FPI was cultivating a 
relationship with the governor as protection for underground activities and voiced 
suspicions that FPI was a front for a secret organization with ties to Islamic groups in 
Malaysia and Thailand.
South Sumatra Council of Indonesian Mujahidin (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI)
The South Sumatra branch of MMI was established on April 15, 2001 at an 
assembly (tabligh akbar) in the Sports Stadium in Palembang. The organizing
51 "Proyek PON XVI dan KKN Baru" (PON XVI and New Corruption), Sriwijaya Post, November 30, 2001; 
"Keluarga Gubenur Sumsel Borong Projek Fasilitas PON XVI 2004" (Family of South Sumatra Governor 
Takes Over Contracts for Facilities for PON XVI 2004), Media Indonesia, November 13, 2001.
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committee, consisting of ninety men, was chaired by Arfan M. Alwy, an alumnus of 
HMI and IAIN Raden Fatah. MMI works for the establishment of shari'ah through 
dakwah and jihad and of a caliphate unifying Muslim peoples to be based in Indonesia, 
which they describe as "an Islamic version of the United Nations." MMI leaders in 
Palembang say that they do not condone the use of violence or force in jihad. 
Democracy is rejected as a Western institution.
MMI in Palembang, which is based at the Mujahidin Mosque, has an active 
program of recruitment. There is a weekly MMI talk show on Radio Hang Tuah 
Palembang on Saturday afternoons. There are meetings for Qur'an study at the MMI 
secretariat on Saturday evenings that generally attract about fifteen people. Qur'an 
study groups also meet on Sunday morning at the MMI mosque and at the South 
Sumatra Foundation for the Wellbeing of the Muslim Community (Yayasan Amanat 
Kesejahteraan Umat Islam Sumsel, AKUIS), which manages one of the most modern 
pesantren in South Sumatra. MMI cadre are trained at AKUIS, where the subjects 
include science as well as religion. The head of the pesantren, KH Muhammad Bardan 
Kindarto, who is also a member of the governing body of MMI, was one of the Islamic 
activists arrested by the New Order for involvement in Komando Jihad.
In January 2002, MMI in South Sumatra organized a three-day Congress at the 
Asrama for Haj pilgrims in Palembang. They initially predicted that a thousand people 
would attend the Congress, which was to be opened by Indonesia's vice-president, 
Hamzah Haz. However, only a few hundred people came, although the Congress was 
given official recognition when the governor of South Sumatra agreed to make the 
closing address.
Islamic Organizations and the Habits of Democracy
In Making Democracy Work, a study analyzing the impact of institutional reforms on 
the emergence of democratic and accountable government in Italy, Robert Putnam and 
his coauthors argue in the tradition of de Tocqueville that the voluntary associations of 
civil society play a crucial role in building the habits of civic engagement and public 
spiritedness. These habits of democracy—public debate, recognition of distinct 
interests and diverse points of view, the ability to compromise, and bonds of social 
trust—are the foundations of a successful democratic polity. The study distinguishes 
between societies in which horizontal organizations with programmatic commitments 
on public issues predominate and those in which personal, patron-client networks 
predominate. In the first kind of society, institutional change intended to democratize 
government is likely to succeed, whereas in societies in which vertical patron-client 
networks predominate, elites will be able to draw on these networks to retain control 
over political, social, and economic resources.52 In Indonesia, organizations of both 
kinds exist side-by-side. Muhammadiyah is an example of an egalitarian organization 
with programmatic commitments. Its success demonstrates the capacity of Indonesians 
to build bonds of trust and to generate the social capital that is the basis for engaging in 
successful collective action in pursuit of public goods. On the other hand, NU is
52 Putnam et al., Making Democracy Work.
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characterized by a tradition of hereditary leadership (keturunan) and more personal, 
patron-client ties.
However, there is a generational split in NU between the older generation, which 
views tradition and the authority of religious teachers as the source of a stable and 
moral society, and the younger generation, which is more supportive of democratic 
values and is working to establish more rational, bureaucratic organizational 
structures. Drs. Malan Abdullahi, chairman of NU in South Sumatra, says that he does 
not regard this split as a threat to NU. Rather, he thinks it makes NU more dynamic. 
Drs. Malan also does not see the new Islamic organizations that have grown up on 
campuses—KAMMI and Hizbut Tahrir (Party of Liberation)—as a threat. He predicts 
that NU youth attracted to these organizations will return to NU and become more 
moderate as they mature.
Change within NU will be a slow process. The transition from patterns of 
traditional and charismatic leadership and vertical patron-client ties to an egalitarian 
organization with more democratic procedures will not be easy to manage. The 
presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) could be said to embody the dilemma 
of relying on a charismatic and traditional leader to establish more democratic forms of 
governance. There was a wide gap between Gus Dur's rhetorical commitment to 
democracy and his arbitrary exercise of power against critics. He continued the 
practice of patron-client politics, appointing a person from NU as minister of religious 
affairs. This allowed NU to push for the appointment of NU members to influential 
positions throughout the ministry, the provincial offices for religious affairs, and the 
state-funded IAIN system. In Palembang, the appointment of an NU member as rector 
of IAIN Raden Fatah in 2003 strengthened traditionalists who see politik in terms of 
patron-client ties rather than an egalitarian competition based on merit. The kiayi (title 
for a respected Islamic teacher or leader) who head NU pesantren in South Sumatra 
have found that they are courted by local political officials who face direct election in 
the coming years. The kiayi tend to view these officials as patrons to whom they 
provide a platform in exchange for funding for their school and other projects.
However, when asked about the biggest change in NU since the fall of Suharto, 
Drs. Malan said that NU members are showing greater initiative in suggesting and 
carrying out projects.53 Since NU is no longer tied to a political party, members now 
put their energy into NU projects.
At the national level, leaders of Muhammadiyah and NU formed an alliance in 
January 2004 to fight against corruption in government. In this campaign, national 
leaders showed how Islamic elements of civil society can play a political role in 
curbing abuses of power. National leaders are also cultivating a new understanding of 
politik as involving strategic alliances for shared goals. In South Sumatra, NU and 
Muhammadiyah leaders recognize that a coalition between the two organizations is 
possible and perhaps advantageous. However, members of NU and Muhammadiyah 
compete keenly for key positions in the IAIN Raden Fatah and for influence with local 
political leaders, so they have yet to make an effort to work together.
53 Author's interview with Drs. Malan Abdullahi, the chairman of the South Sumatra Branch of NU, 
August 2, 2004.
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HMI has a democratic structure and a long history of pragmatic politics and open 
discussion of issues, but one can argue that in South Sumatra HMI has failed to 
respond successfully to the challenge of a more open political environment. Supporters 
of the pro-democracy movement who challenged HMI's support of the New Order and 
promoted a new conception of HMI's role in a more open political environment were 
driven out of the organization by conservative HMI members, backed by leaders of 
KAHMI, the organization's alumni association. This appears to have eroded support 
for HMI among university students, who viewed HMI as part of a patron-client 
network of HMI alumni with their own political agenda.
HMI leaders in Palembang admit that their organization is smaller and less 
important than it was during the New Order.54 KAMMI is now the strongest 
organization on university campuses, except at the Muhammadiyah University, where 
only the youth organization of Muhammadiyah, Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah 
(IMM), is permitted. However, at IAIN Raden Fatah, HMI made a coalition with 
KAMMI to win offices in student government (Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa, BEM, 
Student Executive Body) elections. HMI appears to be learning how to manage to win 
elections without the support of patrons in the HMI alumni organization. At IAIN 
Raden Fatah, parties formed by Islamic youth organizations—IMM, HMI, KAMMI, 
and the NU youth organization Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (Indonesian 
Islamic Students Movement, PMII)—now compete fiercely in elections.
While HMI is no longer the most important training ground for students with 
political ambitions, HMI leaders point out that young HMI alumni have been very 
successful in seeking positions in local government. They are active in political parties 
and reformasi organizations, such as South Sumatra Corruption Watch. They have 
significant organizational skills, and they know how to promote discussion of political 
issues. One example of the way in which these young leaders support democratization 
is a Seminar on Regional Development organized by a former HMI chairman who is 
now a member of the district legislature. I was invited to be one of the speakers and to 
talk about ways to combat corruption. Such events help to broaden the popular 
conception of politik to include participation in collective decision making through 
institutional channels.
The dakwah organizations that grew so rapidly during the last two decades of the 
New Order—Remaja Masjid and FORDS—and the militant Islamic organizations that 
emerged in the post-Suharto period—FPI and MMI—have a predominantly 
authoritarian structure. In the dakwah organizations, leaders do not necessarily involve 
members in decision making, and the procedures for accountability are not effective. 
The militant organizations reject democracy and have a military structure. These 
organizations, which claim to represent a "moral movement" (gerakan moral) that 
stands above politik, are not so successful in recruiting new members in the more open 
political environment of the post-Suharto era. They are most successful in attracting 
support and new members when they direct the frustration of young people toward 
external "enemies," particularly Israel and America, the latter castigated as the front of 
a Western (secular, Jewish-Christian) conspiracy to destroy Islam. But in South
54 Author's interview with Reza, the chairman of HMI at IAIN Raden Fatah, August 1, 2004.
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Sumatra, periodic demonstrations against the West have not provided the basis for 
sustained expansion of these groups.55
While the appeal of dakwah and radical Islamic organizations does not appear to be 
growing, the anti-democratic view they promote—that moral reform and Islamic 
consciousness rather than democracy offers the best hope for a better future—still has 
strong appeal. The ongoing (and perhaps growing) corruption in government and the 
difficulty of legislating reforms that threaten political elites causes great frustration. At 
present, this frustration is being channeled into growing support for the PKS, the 
Islamist party established in 1999 by KAMMI leaders and dakwah activists in 
preparation for Indonesia's first free democratic elections in forty-five years.56 PKS 
leaders argue that democracy provides a way to establish an Islamic government, and 
there is no necessary contradiction between Islam and democracy. Of the Islamic 
organizations discussed in this article, KAMMI has had the most success in meeting 
the challenge of the more open politics of the post-Suharto era, as evidenced by the 
success of PKS in the 2004 elections, when it won 7.34 percent of the vote (compared 
with 1.4 percent in 1999 when it was called Partai Keadilan).
Although KAMMI was established on the basis of closed cells, networked in a 
relatively authoritarian pattern of organization, it learned how to compete in 
democratic elections, winning control of student senates in universities in Palembang. 
KAMMI and PKS have organized emergency help in crisis situations, such as floods 
and landslides, where the government has failed to respond effectively, providing an 
example of effective collective action and public service. These organizations appear to 
have resolved the "contradiction" between a moral movement based on Islamic 
principles and democratic politics by focusing on the need to end corruption. In 2003, 
when the South Sumatra Provincial Legislature voted to disburse Rp.7.5 billion 
($900,000) from the provincial Operating Fund to members of the provincial 
legislature, only the PKS representative refused to take his "cut."57 This kind of 
principled action promotes a new sense of politik as honorable public service. PKS has 
also impressed people in Palembang by choosing a non-Muslim Indonesian Chinese 
candidate to run for the provincial legislature in Bangka, a province settled by Chinese 
tin miners during the colonial period. This decision contributes to a new 
understanding of politik as referring to the legitimate representation of different groups 
with particular interests.
Islamic organizations at the local level are participating in the development of a 
more sophisticated understanding of politics in post-Suharto Indonesia. The model of 
government promoted by the New Order, which represented "Pak Harto" as the father 
of the nation who looked after the interests of all, is being displaced by a model of 
competing elites who seek support from different segments of society. While the 
notion that politik refers to the manipulation of groups and institutions by self­
55 At Bina Dharma University, a private institution that does not have a student government, the Islamist 
organization Lembaga Dakwah Kampus is very strong.
56 In the 2004 election to the provincial legislature, PKS won four seats, three more than in 1999. PKS also 
won seats in several district legislatures.
57 " Anggota DPRD Sumsel Jadi Tersangka" (Legislators Accused), Sriwijaya Post, April 23, 2003; 
"Legislators Implicated," Tempo, May 5, 2003.
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interested elites still has salience, there is growing acceptance of the idea that groups 
with different interests have a legitimate role in the political process of decision 
making. This change grows out of the experience of Muslims in Islamic organizations 
who are realizing the effectiveness of more democratic practices and appeals in 
organizing collective action in pursuit of shared goals.
There also appears to be growing acceptance of the idea that civil society 
(■masyarakat sipil) organizations have a legitimate role in social reform. For instance, the 
women's branches of Muhammadiyah and NU have arranged for "training" by a 
"secular" NGO, the Women's Crisis Center. The PKS representative to the South 
Sumatra Legislature (Dewan Perwikilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) has begun to work 
with NGO activists who help to organize people formerly excluded from the political 
process. Yuswar Hidayatullah, PKS representative in the South Sumatra legislature, 
gave an example of how PKS "supports the people." In 2004, residents of three 
settlements on the outskirts of Palembang sought assistance from the Legal Aid Society 
(LBH Palembang) when the governor directed their eviction from state-owned land so 
that a green belt could be established around the city. LBH activists contacted PKS 
because the party has a position against forced eviction. PKS representative Yuswar 
was able to facilitate a meeting between the villagers and the governor to delay the 
forced removal. Yuswar pointed out that even if PKS wins only a single seat, it can 
facilitate communication between the people and government. Demonstrations are no 
longer the only channel for people to voice their aspirations and protests. The contrast 
between masyarakat sipil and masyarakat madani no longer appears so relevant.
To argue that Islamic organizations in South Sumatra appear to be providing 
lessons in democracy is not to maintain that democratic reforms will succeed in 
Indonesia. The struggle to establish an accountable structure of democratic leadership 
will be long and difficult. But in South Sumatra, the problem is not Islamic or Muslim 
attitudes toward democracy, but rather continuing widespread corruption, the failure 
of legal reform, and the rise of new networks of local political and economic elites.
